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Resolving the Question of Inter-Scalar Legitimacy into Law? 




In this paper, I examine the attempt to apply proportionality balancing (PB) to the coordination 
of the relations between governance regimes, which I call ‘inter-scalar PB’, from the 
perspective of competing institutional arrangements of global governance.  Observing of 
inter-scalar PB becoming a legal technique of management, I argue that it be reconceived as a 
narrative framework within which the fundamental values and principles of individual 
governance regimes can be politically contested without antagonism.  I first discuss the role 
PB has played in the interaction between the law of state immunity and international 
investment law and then take a closer look at the features of inter-scalar PB as intimated in 
those instances: simplism, normativism, institutionalism, and legalism.  I suggest that the 
complex fundamental issues concerning the relationship between governance regimes are left 
out in the proportionality analysis-mediated resolution of regime-induced conflicts, disclosing 
the depoliticization tendency in inter-scalar PB. Juxtaposing it with the indicator project in 
international human rights advocacy, I conclude that both are jurispathic and reflect the 
rationalist propensity in the legal administration of global governance.  PB, reconceived as a 
language in which values, conflicts, and interests of each governance regime can be argued 
and narrated as part of the politics of reconstructing global governance, will help to recast 
global governance in more jurisgenerative terms. 
Key Words: proportionality balancing (PB), inter-scale, regime-induced conflict, 
global governance, jurisgenerative narratives   
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1. Introduction: regime, conflict, and the global rule of law  
Global governance is a concept that eludes legal analysis.1  Nevertheless, there seems to 
be a parallel between the complex multi-layered architecture of global governance and the state 
of international law: both are situated between fragmentation and unity.  On the one hand, as 
with international law, global governance is in search of ‘constitutional’ legal rules and 
principles that apply across individual areas of governance with an eye towards a sense of 
unity.2  On the other hand, the diversification and specialization of global governance mirrors 
                                                 
1 C. Offe, ‘Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?’, (2009) 16 Constellations 550; P. Rosanvallon, Counter-
Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (2008), 259-63.  
2 See J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’, in J.L. 
Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (2009), 3. 
 3 
the fragmentation of international law resulting from the proliferation of special legal regimes.3     
Yet, the landscape of global governance is even more fragmented than that of 
international law.  What threatens the unity of international law is the emergence of special 
legal regimes each of which has its own ethos and telos.4  The focus of scholarship on the 
fragmentation of international law has been on how to steer the relations between different 
legal rules amidst the emergence of special legal regimes.5  In contrast, the fragmentation of 
global governance results not only from the diversity of governance areas but also from the 
myriad actors and the corresponding ‘institutional’ arrangements taking part in the functioning 
of global governance. 6   Apart from conventional actors such as states and international 
organizations, individuals, corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and more 
informal and amorphous committees, working groups, or simply networks of experts, civil 
servants, and other agents cluster around issues of common concern.7  As a result, various 
clusters of concerned stakeholders become institutional components, or rather, governance 
regimes, in the process of multivalent global governance.  As the clusters of concerned 
stakeholders continue to increase, each governance regime is also developing its own norms, 
standards, codes, or autonomous ‘scale’ as I call it in this paper, to help to make coherent 
                                                 
3 Compare B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, and R.B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15, with M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: 
Between Technique and Politics’, (2007) 70 MLR 1.  Cf. B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the 
Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’, (2006) 17 EJIL 483.  For the variations on the 
definition of regime in current literature, see M.A. Young, ‘Introduction: The Productive Friction between 
Regimes’, in M.A. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (2012), 1 at 4-
11.  I shall come back to the concept of regime later.  
4 See A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’, (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999. 
5 See J.L. Dunoff, ‘A New Approach to Regime Interaction’, in Young (ed.), supra note 3, at 136, 139-44. 
6 Ibid., at 137-9, 158-73. 
7 A.-M. Salughter, A New World Order (2004), 131-65. 
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governance decisions in the face of conflicting considerations.8  Moreover, the fragmentation 
of governance is not just a reflection of the practical needs of transnational policymaking.  
Nor is the tension between the myriad governance regimes confined to international relations.9  
Instead, as scholarship on global administrative law indicates, those myriad governance 
regimes are also the producers of various norms that work with formal legal rules underpinning 
the complex international legal order.10  More than an application of the existing international 
legal doctrines to the phenomenon of global governance, to address the question of the 
fragmentation of global governance in legal terms can shed new light on current responses to 
the fragmentation of international law and beyond.11   
Notably, conflict is one of the main themes in scholarship on the fragmentation of 
international law.12  Mindful of the ramifications of the emergence of special legal regimes 
to the international legal order, scholars have attempted to deploy canonical judicial techniques 
of norm conflict avoidance or traditional conflict of laws tools to address various regime-
induced conflicts, including those between general international law and special legal regimes 
and those concerning only the latter.13  Depending on whether the rule conflict occurs within 
                                                 
8 As will be further defined, governance regimes are closely related to special legal regimes but they are not 
identical.  Governance regimes are understood as the sites where standards, guidelines, and other norms that 
underpin the operation of international law, including special legal regimes, are created.   
9 See generally S. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (1983). 
10 See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3.  See also Dunoff, supra note 5, at 159. 
11 See N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the 
International Legal Order’, (2006) 17 EJIL 1. 
12 Young, supra note 3; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 4; G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: 
Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012), 150-73.  It is noteworthy that regime interactions are not 
necessarily conducted in the form of conflicts.  See Dunoff, supra note 5, at 137-8. 
13 See R. Michaels and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Law?: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law’, (2012) 22 Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law 
349; J. Crawford and P. Nevill, ‘Relations between International Courts and Tribunals: The Regime Problem’ in 
Young (ed.), supra note 3, at 235, 236-47. 
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a system or between distinct regimes, different traditional legal techniques of private 
international law have been drawn on in responding to the new conflict-of-laws question.14  
On the other hand, the proliferation of governance regimes further complicates the new 
conflict-of-laws question.  Actor-centred governance regimes may well develop regime-
specific scales,15 even though they operate under a special legal regime.16  It is true that 
regime interaction may take place in nonjudicial fora without conflicts.17  Yet, the more 
regime-specific scales there are, the stronger the needs grow for inter-scalar coordination 
through ‘conflicts of laws arrangements’.18   Pivoting on balancing and proportionality,19 
such conflicts of laws arrangements, which are not confined to the judicial forum, add another 
dimension to the legal resolution of potential conflicts amidst the fragmentation of 
international law and the complexity of global governance.20  
                                                 
14 Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn distinguish between conflicts of norms and conflicts of laws: the 
former refers to legal conflicts within a legal system (or a regime) whereas the latter to those between legal 
systems or regimes.  Michaels and Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 350-1. 
15 See, e.g., M. Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International 
Law’, (2000) 11 EJIL 489; K.J. Vandevelde, ‘Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime’, 
(1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 373. 
16 Cf. Dunoff, supra note 5, at 159. 
17 Ibid., at 138. 
18 See also B. Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’, (2009) 20 EJIL 23, at 55-
6. 
19 For the purpose of elegance, I simply refer to the analytic framework of proportionality analysis and its 
component of balancing as proportionality balancing (PB).  For the importance of balancing in proportionality 
analysis, see K. Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (2012), 13.  See also A. Stone Sweet and J. 
Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’, (2008) 47 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 72, at 87-9.  In an insightful comparative analysis of the German and the Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence, Dieter Grimm observes of the relative weight given to balancing in the judicial 
exercise of proportionality balancing in both jurisdictions.  D. Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and 
German Constitutional Jurisprudence’, (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 383.  For a critical 
discussion of the relationship between proportionality and balancing in the law, see also M. Luterán, ‘The Lost 
Meaning of Proportionality’, in G. Huscroft, B.W. Miller, and G. Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule 
of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (2014), 21 at 23-6. 
20 See, e.g., Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 4; Teubner, supra note 12; Kingsbury, supra note 18, 
at 55-6; C. Joerges, ‘The Idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form’, in C. Joerges and 
E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law 
(2011), 413.  But cf. Michaels and Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 356-7. 
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Against the intellectual backdrop as sketched above, this paper takes a hard look at the 
attempted deployment of proportionality balancing (PB) to issues resulting from the emergence 
of various regimes in global governance, including, but not limited to, the relationship of a 
special legal regime vis-à-vis general international law.21  I shall argue that although PB is 
emblematic of the global mode of constitutionalism in which value conflicts find peaceful 
resolution,22 its deployment to regime-induced conflicts also reveals the limits in the legal 
steering of global governance.  In view of the politics of competing institutional actors and 
stakeholders involved in regime-induced conflicts, ‘inter-scalar PB’ 23  reflects the 
constitutionalist tradition of managing political conflicts with objective rules underpinning the 
concept of the law.24  Yet, in the guise of law’s rationality and objectivity, inter-scalar PB 
also conceals the political character of global governance, opening itself to the criticism of 
subscribing to inbuilt institutional bias at the expense of the global public interest.  Inspired 
by the constructivist school in international relations (IR) scholarship,25 I suggest that the 
inter-scale of PB be reconceived as a narrative framework.  Viewed thus, PB is not so much 
the cross-regime inter-scale in resolving legal conflicts of global governance 26  as the 
framework within which the fundamental values and principles of individual regimes can be 
                                                 
21 This is what I call regime-induced conflicts.  See note 35, infra.  But cf. Crawford and Nevill, supra 
note 13, at 247, 259. 
22 See Section 2, infra. 
23 To avoid confusion, I interchangeably use the terms ‘inter-scalar PB and the ‘inter-scale of PB’ when 
referring to the exercise of PB in resolving regime-induced conflicts. 
24 See A. Somek, Individualism (2008), 140-3, 235-8.  Cf. A. Supiot, Governance by Numbers: The Making 
of a Legal Model of Allegiance (translated by S. Brown) (2017), 42-4, 49-51. 
25 See text at notes 159-60, infra.   
26 E.g., A. van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A 
Methodological Proposal’, (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Studies 483, at 502-6; S.W. Schill, ‘Cross-
Regime Harmonization through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of International Investment Law, the Law 
of State Immunity and Human Rights’, (2012) 27 ICSID Review 87; D. Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of 
International Regime Conflict (2014), 225. 
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politically contested without antagonism.  Facing up to the political question of inter-scalar 
legitimacy and its inherent subjectivity is necessary to address regime-induced conflicts in 
fragmented global governance.  
A terminological clarification on the concept of regime is due before proceeding.  
Regime is not a term of art in law.27  Originating in IR studies, it is defined as a set of ‘implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.28  Despite the lingering 
scepticism about its deployment in legal scholarship,29 the International Law Commission 
(ILC) Study Group on the fragmentation of international law has suggested a tripartite typology 
of ‘special regimes’ in international law, all of which are centred on the particular sets of 
international legal rules oriented towards particular issues. 30   Acknowledging the 
constructivist and political character of the definition of legal regimes and comparing the ILC 
Study Group’s three understandings of special regimes, Margret Young proposes a ‘hybrid 
definition of regimes’.31  Under her definition, ‘regimes are sets of norms, decision-making 
procedures and organisations coalescing around functional issue-areas and dominated by 
particular modes of behaviour, assumptions and biases’.32   Given my focus on the legal 
                                                 
27 Young, supra note 3, at 4.  Notably, James Crawford and Penelope Nevill trace the use of the term 
‘regime’ in international law to the nineteenth century where it referred to a ‘legal framework which governed 
and controlled a particular area of conduct, usually concerning an area of territory’.  Crawford and Nevill, 
supra note 13, at 258 (emphasis added). 
28 S.D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, (1982) 
International Organization 185, at 186.  
29 Crawford and Nevill, supra note13, at 258-9. 
30 ILC Study Group, ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (A/CN.4/L.702) (18 
July, 2006), para. 12. 
31 Young, supra note 3, at 11. 
32 Ibid. 
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management of politics in global governance, the actor is foregrounded in my understanding 
of regimes.  Drawing on Young’s definition as well as the IR classical definition given by 
Stephen Krasner, I thus define governance regimes as institutional actors, formal and informal, 
working on functional issue-areas in global governance and expressing their assumptions and 
biases through their own norms that interact with external norms and legal rules operating in 
the functional issue-areas concerned.33  As regards the usage of special legal regimes in this 
paper, I adopt Young’s foregoing definition, which focuses more attention on legal rules than 
on the norm-producing actors or organizations. 34   Through the lens suggested above, a 
conflict resulting from the emergence of special legal regimes may be reframed as one of 
governance regimes when focus shifts from the rules concerned to the actors that apply them.35         
I structure my argument as follows.  In the first place are examples of how 
proportionality is transposed from the balancing of public interest and rights or conflicting 
rights to the legal resolution of regime-induced conflicts.  I shall discuss the international 
investment legal regime as a case in point.  Scholars in this area have contended that PB can 
be utilized to steer the extra-regime relations of international investment law (IIL) vis-à-vis 
other legal regimes such as human rights law and environmental law and even the law of state 
immunity in general international law.  To what extent they have made a case for the role of 
                                                 
33 Compare Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra note 4, at 1000-01, with Dunoff, supra note 5, at 139.  For 
a much more restrictive, territory-based understanding of regimes, see Crawford and Nevill, supra note13, at 
259. 
34 Along the same line, Crawford and Nevill seem to use regime conflict and rule conflict interchangeably.  
See Crawford and Nevill, supra note 13, at 236. 
35 For this reason, a conflict between a special legal regime and general international law is still one induced 
by the emergence of the former, although the latter is not considered a regime in legal scholarship.  See ibid., 
at 259.  I use regime-induced conflicts rather than regime conflicts to include conflicts between regimes and 
those between a special legal regime and general international law.   
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PB in resolving conflicts between IIL and the law of state immunity will be the focus of Section 
2.  I then take a closer look at these examples to show that regime-induced conflicts are rooted 
in conflicting values whose resolution lies in the political process beyond legal management 
in Section 3.36  I shall argue that when formulated as a rights conflict or in terms of the 
balancing of rights and the public interest, regime-induced conflicts are simplified with 
complex fundamental issues concerning inter-scalar legitimacy concealed.  As will become 
clear in Section 4, to counter the ‘jurispathic’ character of the legal management of regime 
conflicts,37 the inter-scale of PB should be reconceived as a narrative framework within which 
the political question of inter-scalar legitimacy can be confronted.  In Section 5, I conclude 
with a brief note on the implications of the proposed alternative understanding of PB to the 
global rule of law project. 
2. Balancing regime-induced conflicts: new frontiers for 
proportionality  
In this section, I first explain why proportionality and PB become globally attractive to 
jurisdictions of different legal traditions.  Through the lens of the accommodating character 
of proportionality, attempts to find a PB-mediated solution to regime-induced conflicts in 
global governance should come as no surprise.  The second part of this section provides a 
close examination of the attempted application of PB to the international investment legal 
regime, suggesting that such application raises more questions than answers in global 
                                                 
36 For similar views but with different foci, see J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflicts and the European Union 
(2009); V. Jeutner, Irresolvable Norm Conflicts in International Law: The Concept of a Legal Dilemma (2017). 
37 M.-S. Kuo, ‘Taming Governance with Legality? Critical Reflections upon Global Administrative Law as 
Small-c Global Constitutionalism’, (2011) 44 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
55, at 98-9.  
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governance, despite PB’s potential role in the conflicts between IIL and the law of state 
immunity.   
2.1. Turning to accommodation: the attraction of proportionality 
Originating as a judicial doctrine of the nineteenth-century Prussian administrative law,38 
proportionality has not only spread to national jurisdictions of diverse legal traditions in Africa, 
America, Asia, and other European countries but also penetrated the jurisprudence of 
international (quasi)judicial bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization. 39   At the core of the 
proportionality doctrine is a ‘structure’ under which judges adjudicate the validity of an act of 
public authorities in the light of the rights safeguarded in the law.40  Focusing on the question 
of whether the public interest pursued by the impugned act is proportionate to the harm 
inflicted on the rights concerned, the key component of this reasoning structure is balancing: 
if the former outweighs the latter, the impugned rights-limiting act is valid. 41   The 
proportionality principle is thus credited with providing a clear framework of analysis within 
which the reasonableness of a rights-limiting act of public authorities can be carefully 
                                                 
38 M. Cohen-Eliya and I. Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (2013), 10, 25-7. 
39 See Stone Sweet and Mathews, supra note 19, at 111-59; A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality 
and Rights Protection in Asia: Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan – Whither Singapore?’, (2017) 29 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 774. 
40 See Möller, supra note 19, at 179-205. 
41 See generally R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by J. Rivers) (2002).  See also 
Stone Sweet and Mathews, supra note 19, at 88-90; Somek, supra note 24, at 149; Cohen-Eliya and Porat, 
supra note 38, at 16-23; A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (2012), 340, 
378.  Cf. J. Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights: The Origins and Meanings of Postwar Legal Discourse 
(2013), 18-19.  But cf. Grimm, supra note 19, at 393-7.  For the centrality of balancing to Robert Alexy’s 
discussion of proportionality analysis, see N. Petersen, Proportionality and Judicial Activism: Fundamental 
Rights Adjudication in Canada, Germany and South Africa (2017), 45-7.  This formula of weighing also 
applies to the situation in which rights are in conflict.  See Barak, supra, at 342. 
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examined without risking judicial arbitrariness.42  Adopted as the principal doctrinal model 
in rights adjudication, proportionality analysis is presented as the prime example of global 
constitutionalism.43    
Notably, the appeal of PB lies in its accommodating character in the face of conflicting 
interests.  Under the framework of proportionality analysis, rights are no longer trump cards.  
Instead, they are reconceptualised as a default allocation of interests the modification of which 
requires special justification.44   In this way, rights and the public policy in conflict are 
‘translated’ into competing interests.45  Each interest is given certain weight and then weighed 
against each other on a scale.  That which ultimately outweighs other interests in the particular 
context is the one that deserves legal sanction.  In this light, PB appears to be the rational 
‘scale’, which is based on fact and free of prejudice and thus stands ready for deployment in 
different regimes and jurisdictions.46  In the guise of scale, proportionality is evocative of 
objectivity to which the rule of law aspires.47 Taking it further along the lines of the rational 
scale, some scholars suggest that PB be adopted to resolve regime-induced conflicts in global 
governance.  For example, Benedict Kingsbury suggests the deployment of balancing in 
                                                 
42 Stone Sweet and Mathews, supra note 19, at 87-8; Möller, supra note 19, at 179; V. Perju, 
‘Proportionality and Freedom—An Essay on Method in Constitutional Law’, (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 
334, at 339-40, 350-6.  Aharon Barak discriminatingly identifies the closeness of proportionality to 
‘reasonableness in the strong sense’.  Barak, supra note 41, at 377-8. 
43 Stone Sweet and Mathews, supra note 19.  See also Möller, supra note 19. 
44 See M. Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-
Based Proportionality Review’, (2010) 4 Law and Ethics of Human Rights 141.  See also Möller, supra note 
19. 
45 I shall come back to the concept of translation in Section 3, infra. 
46 M. Antaki, ‘The Rationalism of Proportionality’s Culture of Justification’, in Huscroft, Miller, and 
Webber (eds.), supra note 19, at 284, 291-4.  See also M. Klatt and M. Meister, The Constitutional Structure 
of Proportionality (2012), 8-12.  But cf. Somek, supra note 24, at 143, 149. 
47 For the cultural evocations of mathematical objectivity surrounding the idea of proportionality, see Supiot, 
supra note 24, at 75-7. 
 12 
steering the inter-governance regime relations in global governance.  Mindful that each 
governance area tends to become a distinct regime with its own rules of administration, 
Kingsbury ascribes regime-induced conflicts to the differing interests among the stakeholders 
of individual regimes and thus contends that regime-induced conflicts be resolved through 
some ‘conflicts of laws arrangements’. 48   Notably, at the core of the ‘conflicts of laws 
arrangements’ he alludes to is the allocation of and the assessment of ‘weight’ among the 
conflicting regimes.49  PB is thus projected beyond its traditional applications where rights 
are always at stake to conflicts of governance regimes.50   
It is no surprise that the proposed unconventional deployment of proportionality analysis 
outside the balancing of rights and public interests or conflicting rights is contentious.  For 
example, it is questionable whether regime-specific rules and their corresponding values are 
comparable.  Failing this condition, the global scale on which PB is premised would not 
obtain.51  Yet, such criticism essentially amounts to a restatement of what has long been said 
of PB in its conventional deployment within the same legal order. 52   In view of PB’s 
continuing popularity in various jurisdictions, it is not far-fetched to say that the 
                                                 
48 Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 55-6. 
49 Ibid., at 55. 
50 See also C. Joerges, ‘Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation and Conflicts Law as Europe’s 
Constitutional Form’, in R. Nicke and A. Greppi (eds.), The Changing Role of Law in the Age of Supra- and 
Transnational Governance (2014), 127-76; H. Muir Watt, ‘Conflicts of Laws Unbounded: The Case for a 
Legal-Pluralist Revival’, (2016) 7 Transnational Legal Theory 313; N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The 
Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010), 12, 295-6. 
51 E.g., E. Guntrip, ‘International Human Rights Law, Investment Arbitration and Proportionality Analysis: 
Panacea or Pandora’s Box?’, EJIL: Talk!, 7 January 2014, available at www.ejiltalk.org/international-human-
rights-law-investment-arbitration-and-proportionality-analysis-panacea-or-pandoras-box/; J. Finke, ‘Regime-
collisions: Tensions Between Treaties (and How to Solve Them)’, in C.J. Tams et al. (eds.), Research 
Handbook on the Law of Treaties (2016), 415. 
52 See T. Endicott, ‘Proportionality and Incommensurability’, in Huscroft, Miller, and Webber (eds.), supra 
note 19, at 311. 
 13 
incommensurability question falls far short of dampening the enthusiasm about the deployment 
of PB in regime-induced conflicts.  As PB continues to travel across jurisdictions in spite of 
the foregoing scepticism, it has been considered to be ‘a tool that can harmonize the 
relationship between …bodies of general or special international law’ in the fragmented 
landscape of global governance.53  And, IIL is a good example. 
2.2. Proportioning regime-induced conflicts in global governance? 
the case of the international investment legal regime 
Notably, PB has been adopted by arbitral tribunals as the doctrinal tool to reconcile the 
investor rights and the host state’s public policy, or rather, the right to regulate in investor-state 
disputes.54  On closer inspection, however, the issues clustered under the rubric of the investor 
rights and the host state’s right to regulate are not just an expression of the conflicts between 
the host state’s domestic law and its obligations under international law, i.e., the investment 
treaties with the IIL regime.  Instead, they can be seen as a refraction of regime-induced 
conflicts and thus how they are resolved has wider implications to global governance.  
Specifically, to the extent that the policy goals pursued by the host state through regulatory 
changes such as sustainable development and the protection of human rights reflect what 
                                                 
53 Schill, supra note 26, at 108. 
54 See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (17 March, 2006), 
para. 306; Joseph C Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (14 
January, 2010), para. 285; Total SA v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Award (8 
December, 2010), para. 123; El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15, Award (31 October 2011), paras. 241-3, 365-74.  For further commentary on these cases, see 
Schill, supra note 26, at 107; A. Stone Sweet and F. Grisel, The Evolution of International Arbitration: 
Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy (2017), 198-203.  See also C. Henckels, Proportionality and 
Deference in Investor-State Arbitration: Balancing Investment Protection and Regulatory Autonomy (2015).  
Cf. B. Kingsbury and S.W. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest—The Concept of Proportionality’, in S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (2010), 75.  Cf. L.W. Mouyal, International Investment Law and the Right 
to Regulate: A Human Rights Perspective (2016), 31-6.  
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international treaty regimes provide for, the dispute between the investor and the host state also 
concerns the relationship between IIL and international environment law or international 
human rights law (IHRL).  Thus, in such instances, the PB exercised by arbitral tribunals is 
not only a calculation of the relative weight of the investor rights vis-à-vis the host state’s right 
to regulate.55  It effectively puts weights on the scales of the interests protected by IIL and 
those codified in the treaty regimes concerned.56   
Yet, the double implications of the foregoing balancing exercise reveals its controversial 
character in the hands of arbitral tribunals.  As the doctrinal framework within which the 
investor rights and the host state’s right to regulate are to be weighed and decided, PB puts the 
host state’s jurisdiction to prescribe, or, simply, sovereignty, and the foreign investor rights on 
the same scale.  Deciding in favour of the host state, the arbitral tribunal would be susceptible 
to criticism for its failure to uphold the IIL special regime.57  In contrast, as the rising concern 
over the arbitration clause in trade agreements or investment treaties suggests,58 subscribing 
to the investor’s claim means bending sovereignty to the private interests of foreign investors.59  
On the other hand, as the inter-scale between IIL and other special legal regimes, PB in 
investment arbitration is often suspected of rendering awards that reflect the assumed values 
                                                 
55 This is mostly obvious in the investor-state arbitration.  Notably, Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel 
suggest the application of PB in international commercial arbitration when arbitrators need to enforce 
mandatory law and public policy.  See Stone Sweet and Grisel, supra note 54, at 172-86.  
56 Ibid., at 197-8, 244-5. 
57 Cf. J.A. VanDuzer, ‘Sustainable Development Provisions in International Trade Treaties: What Lessons 
for International Investment Agreements?’, in S. Hindelang and M. Krajewski (eds.), Shifting Paradigms in 
International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified (2016), 142 at 173. 
58 See S.W. Schill, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A (Comparative and International) 
Constitutional Law Framework’, (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 649, at 650-1. 
59 See Mouyal, supra note 54, at 17-19; G.V. Harten and M. Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Species of Global Administrative Law’, (2006) 17 EJIL 121, at 146; A. Kaushal, ‘Revisiting History: How the 
Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime’, (2009) 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 491, at 511-12. 
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of the former at the expense of, say, environmental protection.60  Even so, PB is proposed to 
address IIL’s ‘external’ relations with core classical areas of international law.  Stephan 
Schill’s proposal for steering the relationship between IIL and the law of state immunity is a 
case in point.61   
With the host state’s jurisdictional immunities waived, investors acquired the status of 
legal subject in the proceedings of investor-state arbitration.  This has been welcomed as an 
innovative loosening of the state-centric Westphalian international legal order.62  Yet, Schill 
notes that the law of state immunity remains a legal obstacle to the full protection of the 
investor rights as enforcement immunities continue to prevent the execution of arbitral awards, 
frustrating the realization of IIL’s goal.63  Apart from the explicit reservation in Article 55 of 
the ICSID Convention,64 the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) seems to leave state immunity from 
enforcement relating to investor-state arbitration unaffected, 65  although the latter mainly 
concerns the awards of commercial arbitration between private parties.66  It is true that the 
                                                 
60 A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (2012), 258-9.  But cf. Stone Sweet 
and Grisel, supra note 54, at 245-6. 
61 Schill, supra note 26. 
62 Ibid., at 91-101. 
63 Ibid., at 89-90, 104-5. 
64 ‘Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State 
relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.’  Article 55 of the ICSID 
Convention.  Although ‘execution’ is chosen for the purpose of Article 55, which is thus distinguished from 
both Articles 53 and 54 where ‘enforce’ and ‘enforcement’ are adopted, Andrea K. Bjorklund suggests that their 
meanings are identical when it comes to the attachment of the respondent host state’s property.  A.K. 
Bjorklund, ‘State Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards’, in C. Binder et al. (eds.), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009), 302 at 306. 
65 Bjorklund notes that the provision for the enforcement of arbitral awards ‘in accordance with the rules of 
the procedure of the territory where the award is relied on’ in Article III and the public policy exception in 
Article V (2) (b) are susceptible to the interpretation that state immunity from enforcement is unaffected, 
despite variations on state practice.  Ibid., at 308-9. 
66 As the scope of the ICSID Convention is narrower, some investor-state arbitrations have to rely on the 
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foregoing treaty reservation of enforcement immunities does not generally prevent the 
execution of arbitral awards concerning foreign investors.67  Nevertheless, it continues to be 
the focus of commentary on IIL while the execution of international commercial arbitral 
awards itself has been brought before several tribunals arbitrating investment disputes.68   
Drawing on those arbitral awards,69 Schill suggests that such treaty-underpinned arbitral 
tribunals can be the forum to address the issues of the international investment legal regime 
vis-à-vis enforcement immunities, at least, in part.70  Moreover, inspired by the case law of 
investor-state arbitration that applies PB to cases concerning the impact of the exercise of the 
host state’s right to regulate on the foreign investor rights (including the requirement of 
compensation for expropriation), 71  he contends that the host state’s domestic law on 
enforcement immunities should be balanced against the investor rights.72  Specifically, he 
argues that the host state’s domestic law on enforcement immunities, which operationalizes 
the general international law of state immunity, be considered part of the host state’s exercise 
of its right to regulate.  Paralleling the steering of the relations between IIL and other special 
legal regimes as discussed above, Schill suggests that the arbitral tribunal’s exercise of PB 
                                                 
New York Convention for the enforcement of the award.  See ibid., at 308.  
67 See also ibid., at 321.  Cf. Stone Sweet and Grisel, supra note 54, at 2-3. 
68 See C. Priem, ‘International Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Potential Check for Domestic Courts 
Refusing Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards’, (2014) 10 New York University Journal of Law &. 
Business 189, at 196-217; C. Annacker, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Tool to “Enforce” Arbitral 
Awards?’, Global Arbitration Review, 16 November, 2014.  
69 The awards Schill discusses include Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/17, Award, 5 February 2008), Saipem SpA v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009), and Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v. 
The Republic of Ecuador (PCA Case No. 34877, UNCITRAL, Partial Award on the Merits, 30 March 2010).  
Schill, supra note 26, at 104-5. 
70 Ibid., at 104-5. 
71 See cases cited at note 54, supra. 
72 Schill, supra note 26, at 106-8. 
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concerning the host state’s right to regulate in the area of enforcement immunities amounts to 
an assessment of the relative weight of the general international law of state immunity and 
IIL. 73   Viewed thus, PB is conducted as if to resolve conflicts between two bodies of 
international law: the law of state immunity and IIL. 
On closer inspection, however, Schill’s foregoing account of the case law of investment 
arbitration on enforcement and the role of PB in the steering of the relations between the law 
of state immunity and IIL is not without question.  First, the arbitral awards Schill draws on 
for support fall short of tackling enforcement immunities proper.  They do concern issues 
resulting from the legal obstacle of enforcement immunities.  Yet, not all issues concerning 
the enforcement of arbitral awards may be resolved by answering the question of enforcement 
immunities.  To put it simply, none of the arbitral awards addresses issues arising under the 
law of state immunity.74  The arbitral case law hardly lends support to Schill’s assertion that 
the issues of the IIL regime vis-à-vis the law of state immunity can be resolved in the investor-
state arbitration.  Second, Schill’s suggestion that the treaty-underpinned arbitral tribunals 
apply PB to the relationship between the law of state immunity, by way of the host state’s right 
to regulate in the area of enforcement immunities, and the IIL special regime apparently would 
put the conventional wisdom on the relations between general international law and special 
legal regimes into question.  Pace the foregoing suggestion, the treaty-underpinned arbitral 
tribunal is expected to decide ‘international’ legal disputes and abide by the rules concerning 
enforcement immunities in general international law.75  As enforcement immunities concern 
                                                 
73 See ibid., at 105-6. 
74 Schill acknowledges this discrepancy, too.  Ibid. 
75 See G. Born, ‘A New Generation of International Adjudication’, (2012) 61 Duke Law Journal 775, at 831-
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the primary rules, instead of the secondary rules such as state responsibility, in general 
international law, the principle of lex specialis does not apply in such instances.76  A fortiori, 
the general international law of state immunity is to be upheld, not balanced, against the IIL 
special regime.77 
Nevertheless, Schill’s breakdown of the objectives of the domestic law governing 
enforcement immunities suggests a new way in which the law of state immunity can be 
reconceived in global governance.  According to Schill, what lies beneath the law of state 
immunity is a cluster of public interests.  Doctrines of jurisdictional and enforcement 
immunities should not be simply seen as a legacy of the Westphalian legal order atop which 
sits the concept of state sovereignty.  Rather, they crystallize the idea that the state is 
instrumental in the realization of public good and thus it needs freedom from frivolous lawsuits 
and the possible enforcement proceedings for that purpose.  Seen in this light, domestic 
legislation on jurisdictional and enforcement immunities reflects the concerns at the core of 
the general international law of state immunity, which can be weighed and assessed under the 
PB framework.78  
For the reasons stated above, this breakdown approach to the general international law of 
state immunity does not seem to bear much on the investment disputes brought before the 
treaty-underpinned arbitral tribunals.  Yet, it suggests a new perspective on the investor’s 
                                                 
44. 
76 See B. Simma and T. Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First 
Steps Towards a Methodology’, in Binder et al., (eds.), supra note 64, at 678, 682-91.  See also Mouyal, supra 
note 54, at 47-65. 
77 See Simma and Pulkowski, supra note 3, at 498-500.  Cf. A. Roberts, ‘Triangular Treaties: The Extent 
and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights’, (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 353, at 363. 
78 Schill, supra note 26, at 96-8, 102-8. 
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enforcement of arbitral awards vis-à-vis the property of the host state in third states.  In the 
first place, it should be noted that the municipal court of the third state where the property of 
the respondent host state’s property lies and is sought to be attached also functions as an 
institutional player in global investment governance regime when it is seized by the investor 
to enforce the arbitral awards. 79   Applying domestic law on enforcement immunities, 
however, the municipal court of the third state seized is not as restricted as the treaty-
underpinned arbitral tribunal in deciding the weight of the general international law of state 
immunity.  In the light of the ECHR jurisprudence, Schill thus makes a point of suggesting 
that the immunity the forum state’s court extends to a foreign state should not be viewed as 
automatic or absolute.80  Rather, it is an exercise of discretion in the pursuit of public interest 
such as the consideration of the diplomatic relations between the forum state and the 
respondent foreign state under the guidance of proportionality analysis.81  Viewed thus, the 
forum state’s court seized in the proceedings of arbitral award enforcement is expected to 
balance the public interest of preventing the execution of the designated property of the 
respondent as a foreign sovereign state against the claimant’s investor rights under IIL.82  In 
this way, the forum state’s court virtually recalibrates the relationship between the general 
international law of state immunity, by way of its domestic law on enforcement immunities, 
                                                 
79 See C. Schreuer, ‘Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law’, in A.W. 
Rovine, Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers (2010), 71, at 
84-6.  In this light, a parallel can be drawn between the municipal court of the forum state and ‘distributed 
administration’ in global administrative law, which means ‘domestic regulatory agencies’ that ‘act as part of the 
global administrative space’ and ‘take decisions on issues of foreign or global concern’.  See Kingsbury 
Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3, at 21-2. 
80 Schill, supra note 26, at 112-15. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., at 117-18.  The result is likely to move in the direction of what has been called the ‘restrictive 
theory of immunity’.  See Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 304. 
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and the IIL special regime under the PB framework. 
As the above example illustrates, domestic courts may play a role in the decentralized 
international investment regime.83  It shows how the traditional international legal issues such 
as the relationship between general international law and special legal regimes and that 
between the international and municipal legal orders can be studied afresh from the perspective 
of global governance.   Moreover, it suggests that as PB has been tapped into for resolving 
the conflict between public interest and rights, there appears to be no reason to exclude regime-
induced conflicts in global governance from the application of PB, including those concerning 
the law of state immunity and IIL.  Whether this is true is the theme to which I turn next.   
3. In the name of law: managing politics of inter-scalar legitimacy 
through proportionality 
Balancing occupies centre stage in the exercise of proportionality analysis.84  For this 
reason, to decide whether PB analysis can provide an effective tool in resolving regime-
induced conflicts requires further assessment of how balancing works.  As Ralf Michaels and 
Joost Pauwelyn perceptively observe, balancing functions as a conflict-resolving rule within 
the same legal order insomuch as each legal order presumes ‘an objective standard for the 
respective weight of each principle’ in conflict.85  Yet, no such objective standard can be 
presumed across legal orders.  Thus, the very absence of a common standard casts doubt on 
the application of PB to conflicts that extend beyond a single legal order.86  Even so, Section 
                                                 
83 Born, supra note 75, at 831. 
84 See note 41 and accompanying text, supra. 
85 Michaels and Pauwelyn, supra note 13, at 356. 
86 Ibid., at 368. 
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2 shows that amidst the rising concerns over potential regime-induced conflicts, PB is still 
being tipped as a promising response in the pursuit of cross-regime inter-scale in the legal 
administration of global governance.  Departing from the prior question of applicability,87 I 
now turn focus to what lies beneath the enthusiasm about PB and the issues its application may 
entail.   
As suggested above, ‘translation’ plays a key part in the exercise of PB with respect to 
regime-induced conflicts. 88   This is not a phenomenon tied to cross-regime relations.  
Rather, translation is a common phenomenon that has long been observed in the practice of 
legal interpretation.  Not only does the use of comparative law require translation in the literal 
sense,89 applying the statutory text to a concrete case or controversy requires translation, too.90  
The necessity of translation raises the question of ‘fidelity’ in legal interpretation.91  Failing 
the requirement of fidelity, translation is nothing less than manipulation and interpretation 
blends into invention.92  It is necessary to examine the features of the exercise of PB in the 
steering of regime-induced conflicts to judge whether fidelity has been lost in the translation. 
The first feature of inter-scalar PB is what I call simplism.  As the analytical framework 
of proportionality analysis indicates, competing values, whether they concern two conflicting 
rights or implicate public interest on the one hand and rights on the other, are the protagonists 
in the exercise of balancing.  To fit into this framework, governance regimes in conflict need 
                                                 
87 I shall further address the issues surrounding the question of applicability in Section 4, infra. 
88 See text at note 45, supra. 
89 See generally S. Glanert (ed.), Comparative Law - Engaging Translation (2014). 
90 W.N. Eskridge, Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994), 128-32. 
91 L. Lessig, ‘Fidelity in Translation’, (1993) 71 Texas Law Review 1165.  
92 Ibid., at 1168-9. 
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to be translated into competing values.  On this view, each regime represents a predominant 
value.  A regime-induced conflict boils down to the clash of fundamental values.  That 
process appears to be another instance of legal practice.  After all, one of the law’s principal 
functions is to reduce the complexity of social interaction so that it can be managed through 
the normative frame of legal authority.93  Yet, in inter-scalar PB, simplification takes place 
with respect to two sets of norms underpinning governance regimes in conflict.  This suggests 
that simplification here is more a question of interpretation, or rather, translation, than  a 
reduction of social complexity to legal norms.  Thus, what matters is whether the translation 
of a governance regime into a value faithfully reflects the reality.   
It is noteworthy that a governance regime not only concerns substantive values but also 
includes a set of secondary rules on its compliance in many instances. 94   The chosen 
compliance mechanism attached to individual regimes reflects a balance of different values 
and policy goals.  For example, the periodic review widely adopted in IHRL is a function of 
balancing the importance of human rights and the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. 95  
Moreover, substantive provisions of a special legal regime implicate multiple and conflicting 
values.  The tension between the designation of exclusive economic zones (articles 55-75) 
and the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas (article 87 (1) (e)) in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea is just one example.96  Seen in this light, each governance 
                                                 
93 See J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 
(translated by W. Rehg) (1996), 326-8; N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (translated by K.A. Ziegert) 
(2004), 94. 
94 Cf. Simma and Pulkowski, supra note 3, at 492-3. 
95 D. Shelton, ‘International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards’, (2007) 25 Law 
and Inequality 467, at 491-505. 
96 J.L. Bailey, ‘States, Stocks, and Sovereignty: High Seas Fishing and the Expansion of State Sovereignty’, 
in N.P. Gleditsch (ed.), Conflict and the Environment (1997), 215 at 220. 
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regime is a complex of differing values and a result of compromise and balancing at once.  
Thus, to translate a multivalent governance regime into a predominant value to fit into the 
framework of proportionality analysis means a simplification of the intra-regime diverse values 
concerned.  Compared to the reduction of social complexity to legal norms, which is 
characteristic of the law’s relationship with the external environment, the operation of 
translation in the context of global governance as observed above would involve a double 
reduction: the initial reduction of social complexity into a multivalent governance regime 
followed by a further reduction of the latter into a predominant value.97  Yet, thanks to 
simplism, PB appears to provide a handy general working framework for resolving various 
regime-induced conflicts.  
Related to the feature of simplism is the inbuilt normative attitude towards regime-
induced conflicts when they are translated into a particular kind of questions under the 
framework of proportionality analysis.  As indicated above, proportionality is aimed at 
delimiting the scope of a right in context when its exercise appears to be in clash with the 
public interest or another right.  The translation of regime-induced conflicts into the question 
susceptible of proportionality analysis is a simplified conversion of a governance regime into 
a value, and a normative one at that, i.e., the subject of a right.  Take IIL again.  Foreign 
investment has long been considered crucial to the economic development in the less 
developed countries and mutually beneficial to capital-exporting countries.98  Guided by the 
                                                 
97 With such a double move of reduction, the issues concerning the opaqueness of global governance are 
likely to be further aggravated. 
98 See E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J.-W. Lee, ‘How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect 
Economic Growth?’, (1998) 45 Journal of International Economics 115; X. Li and X. Liu, ‘Foreign Direct 
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policy goals of facilitating foreign investment in the pursuit of further development, IIL 
requires arbitration before the home state can espouse the investor’s claim through diplomatic 
protection.99  In this way, IIL the protection of foreign investors’ interests seems to be taken 
out of international politics and placed under the legal framework.  Gradually it evolves into 
a special regime underpinned by the investor-state arbitration.100  Yet, when regime-induced 
conflicts concerning IIL arise, inter-scalar PB prefers to focus on normative questions 
concerning the scope and content of rights rather than engage in the debate about policy choices 
in individual governance regimes.101  This is what I call ‘normativism’, which constitutes 
another feature of the inter-scale of PB. 
The third feature, which I term ‘institutionalism’, has less to do with PB itself than the 
identity of its object of measurement in regime-induced conflicts.  I have noted in Section 1 
that the fragmented landscape of global governance results not only from the development of 
individual treaty regimes in the international legal order but also from the profusion of formal 
and informal institutional arrangements in global administration.102  Seen in this light, the unit 
that is involved in the regime-induced conflict is not limited to a self-contained treaty 
regime.103  Rather, as indicated in Section 1, regime-induced conflicts also take place between 
the myriad formal and informal institutional arrangements of global governance.  Thus, units 
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99 ICSID Convention Article 27 (1). 
100 J.W. Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, (2010) 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal 427, at 446-8. 
101 Even when issues concerning the law of state immunity are brought up before the investor-state arbitral 
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more of sovereignty than right.  Cf. Mouyal, supra note 54, at 79-80.    
102 For the idea of global administration and its role in the analysis of global governance, see Kingsbury 
Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 3, at 18-27.  
103 See also Simma and Pulkowski, supra note 3, at 490-4. 
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in regime-induced conflicts include those institutional arrangements in the administration of 
global governance, regardless of whether they belong to the same treaty regime.  This focus 
on institution bears greatly on the deployment of PB to regime-induced conflicts.  As 
discussed above, the exercise of PB rests on the identification of a distinct value with each unit 
involved in a conflict.  As the units in a regime-induced conflict turn out to be the institutional 
arrangements, the focus will be more on the identification of the predominant value emitted 
from each institutional entity than on the discovery of a distinctive value in each self-contained 
treaty regime.  Notably, Kingsbury suggests that with no global ‘public’ in sight, the idea of 
the public in global governance should be understood in a diffuse way as each institutional 
‘entity’ together with the stakeholders centring around it constitutes a ‘public’,104 reflecting 
the feature of institutionalism.  The ‘conflict of laws arrangement’, which he proposes to 
govern the relations between governance regimes, amounts to an ‘inter-public law’, or rather, 
an inter-regime law.105  Thus, institutionalism is characteristic of inter-scalar PB in that its 
object of measurement extends to the institutional entities of global governance.  
‘Legalism’ is the fourth feature of the inter-scale of PB.  As the feature of 
institutionalism suggests, what is characteristic of the approach of PB to regime-induced 
conflicts is its association of conflicts with the diffuse publics organized around individual 
institution-pivoted governance regimes.  Each governance regime brings a cluster of 
stakeholders to itself and becomes a public and a unit of conflict in global governance.  Seen 
in this light, regime-induced conflicts result from the disagreement between individual clusters 
                                                 
104 Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 56. 
105 Ibid., at 55-6; B. Kingsbury, ‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’, in H.S. Richardson and M.S. 
Williams (eds.), Moral Universalism and Pluralism: NOMOS XLIX (2008), 167 at 190-1.  
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of stakeholders with respect to the governance matters that implicate multiple regimes.  To 
put it bluntly, regime-induced conflicts are reflective of the politics playing out among the 
stakeholders in global governance.106  Against this backdrop, PB appears to be a legal means 
to tame politics as it provides a legal framework within which politics can be recast.107  
Reining in politics through law is surely a noble dream worth pursuing.  Yet, as Alexander 
Somek perceptively observes, in the exercise of PB, ‘one is left with a constitutional conception 
that reaches out, at bottom, beyond law’.108  Even so, efforts have been made to reduce PB’s 
value-laden character so much so that it is even expressed through an economics-inspired 
‘indifference curve’109  or presented as a ‘formula’,110  suggesting the legal objectivity to 
which it aspires.111  Thus, the enchantment of PB is not so much about the legal solution it 
ostensibly provides as about the legal image it emits.  Through this lens of legalism, the 
political issues at the core of the relations between governance regimes such as diverse values, 
differing policy goals, and distinct interests are recast as legal questions in inter-scalar PB.112   
The four features—simplism, normativism, institutionalism, and legalism—raise 
fundamental issues about fidelity and beyond in the emerging adoption of PB as the inter-scale 
for regime-induced conflicts.  As noted above, framing the question of regime-induced 
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conflicts as one susceptible of PB requires translation, and fidelity is the lynchpin of 
translation.  Yet, the double reduction of the social complexity to a governance regime and 
the latter further to a predominant value (simplism), the inbuilt normative inclination in the 
rights-oriented framing of conflicts (normativism), and the juridification of policy issues (legal 
objectivism) indicate that what is reflected in the analysis of PB is a refracted image of what 
is really going on between conflicting governance regimes.113  As a result, inter-scalar PB 
fails to reflect fully the complexity of competing interests in regime-induced conflicts.  
Fidelity is thus lost in the translation of regime-induced conflicts into what is suitable for PB, 
entailing an even more opaque landscape of global governance and calling the legitimacy of 
inter-scalar PB into doubt.   
Through the lens of institutionalism, the special character of legitimacy conceived in the 
invocation of PB in regime-induced conflicts becomes clearer.  It is true that through the 
equation of the institutional entity-attached stakeholders as a public, or rather, a conflict unit, 
in the relationship between governance regimes, institutionalism has the virtue of clarity in 
determining what constitutes a public, which further serves as the marker of what interests 
must be reckoned with in deformalized global governance.114  Nevertheless, it cannot conceal 
the fact that access to global governance and its myriad regimes is not equal.  Resources, 
including budget, education, communication, and even personal connection, determine who 
gains better access to governance regimes and is thus included as stakeholder.115  Achieving 
                                                 
113 For a discussion of the concept of juridification and its relationship with legalism, see G. Silverstein, 
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114 Kuo, supra note 107, at 1000-01. 
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the status of stakeholder is the stepping-stone to the decision-making process through which 
the predominant value or interest of a governance regime is given expression.  Together with 
normativism and legal objectivism, institutionalism works to simplify the complexity of 
political issues such as the definition of global publics and the delimitation of governance 
regimes.116  As a result, the inter-scale of PB ostensibly depoliticizes the operation of global 
governance, only risking obscuring global governance even more.117            
4. From technique of inter-scale to narrative of global 
governance: proportionality reconceived 
The seemingly apolitical and objective inter-scale of PB is more than a trait of the steering 
of regime-induced conflicts.  It is also a symptom of the legal administration of global 
governance.  I hasten to add that the quest for objectivity has long been characteristic of the 
rule of law.  Yet, legal objectivity is only plausible within a common political space.118  In 
the face of the transboundary character of contemporary governance issues and the fragmented 
political landscape of global administration, attempts to engender legal objectivity look to 
global ‘scales’, generic ‘benchmarks’, or numerical ‘indicators’ for the solution.119  These are 
considered the way out of the political thicket of global governance, and towards legal 
objectivity without a common political space, as they transcend locality, exemplify 
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universality, and are value-free in the eyes of the public.120   
The propensity towards legal objectivity as expressed in PB is reflective of a broad 
phenomenon in global governance and IHRL is a case in point.  Let us take a closer look at 
the international human rights regime.  One of the principal issues in the implementation of 
IHRL is the generality and abstractness of rights.121  Despite the commentary the treaty bodies 
have issued on the provisions of human rights treaties, its legal effect is not without question.122  
It is also doubtful that a one-size-fits-all interpretation from a distant treaty body can apply to 
all societies the world over.  Moreover, domestic implementing authorities with economic, 
technological, cultural, and social differences rarely arrive at the same rendering in the 
interpretation of a human right.123  As a result, efforts to put teeth into the international human 
rights regime by means of treaty codification only yield limited results.124  
Seen in this light, it is not hard to understand why the international human rights 
movement stalls when it comes to implementation and enforcement.  As the history of 
national struggles for rights indicates, the realization of human rights is always entwined with 
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politics.125  Negotiated compromise is central to politics and cannot be dictated from the top 
or from afar.  It is a product of local politics and social dialogue.  The politics of human 
rights is no exception.126  To reach a uniform rendering through the complex and dynamic 
discursive politics in a pluralist world is a tall order.  For this reason, IHRL suffers from the 
lack of clear standards and concrete prescriptions, weakening both its legal effect and practical 
impact.127  Thus, along with the barriers arising from the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, 
the lack of clarity poses another challenge to the global implementation and promotion of 
human rights.  Against this backdrop began the move towards ‘techniques’ in the 1990s.128  
It was argued that, by turning to indicators, benchmarks, and statistical measurements, 
advocates for human rights could focus on the seemingly neutral, demonstrable statistics, and 
league tables and thus ‘bypass’ the complicated local politics in the quest for legal objectivity 
despite the lack of political consensus.129  In this way, the international human rights legal 
regime could seek to influence the behaviours of local actors without direct intervention, i.e. 
‘govern at a distance’.130  With the focus shifting from treaty interpretation to measurable 
monitoring, IHRL was thus cloaked with objectivity, uniformity, and certainty.  The 
‘indicator project’ at the core of international human rights advocacy enhances the legal status 
and practical impact of the international human right regime,131 suggesting the resurgence of 
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the undying idea of nonhuman law.132   
To be clear, the inter-scale of PB is not just a statistical exercise and the element of 
judgment cannot be completely taken out of equation.133  Instead, its juxtaposition with the 
indicator project reveals that the emphasis on the resolution or management of regime-induced 
conflicts by virtue of legal objectivity reflects the general unease about the political uncertainty 
and complexity in the administration of global governance.  In the legal response to the 
politics of the interaction between governance regimes, PB stands out for the aura of reason, 
objectivity, and neutrality, with which the image of proportionality as a scale is associated and 
to which the law aspires.134  The adoption of PB as the legal inter-scale of regime-induced 
conflicts shares the rationalist propensity in the pursuit of techniques of indicators, 
benchmarks, and statistical measurements in international human rights advocacy.135 
If so, is this a welcome development in the global rule of law project?  Before answering 
that question, let us take IHRL again.  One fundamental criticism about the rationalist 
propensity in the international human rights regime’s continuing pursuit for more accurate 
benchmarks and more sophisticated indicators is its shadowing effect on the reality and 
complexity of global governance.  Disguised in value-free numerals, these new techniques of 
                                                 
132 Alain Supiot notes the age-old ‘fascination with numbers and their systematising powers’ as a counter to 
the manmade law that is susceptible to arbitrary will.  Nonhuman law can take different forms in different 
periods of history.  In ancient times, the law of nature that embodies the harmony of cosmos is one example.  
See Supiot, supra note 24, at 67-73. 
133 M. Kumm and A.D. Welen, ‘Human Dignity and Proportionality: Deontic Pluralism in Balancing’, in 
Huscroft, Miller, and Webber (eds), supra note 19, at 67, 69-70.  See also Luterán, supra note 19, at 29-41. 
134 G.F. Gaus, ‘Public Reason and the Rule of Law’, in I. Shapiro (ed.), The Rule of Law: NOMOS XXXVI 
(1994), 328.  For the embeddedness of proportionality in law, see Luterán, supra note 19, at 23-9. 
135 McGrogan, supra note 120, at 397.  For the rationalist propensity in proportionality balancing, see 
Antaki, supra note 46. 
 32 
governance seem to be able to dodge politics.136  Out of this comes the apolitical character of 
the indicator project.  Seen in this light, the indicator project appears to be free of value 
judgment and policy choice, embodying the ‘sovereignty of technique’.137  Yet, it is also for 
its politics-averse techniques that the indicator project is accused of ‘diminishing moral 
discourse in human rights’ and keeping the contestation about the implementation of IHRL 
from the ‘conversation of human societies’.138    
The depoliticization criticism of the rationalist propensity of the indicatory project sheds 
illuminating light on the deployment of PB in resolving regime-induced conflicts.  As the 
four features in the inter-scale of PB shows, the politics of regime-induced conflicts is reframed 
in terms of issues to be addressed through legal reasoning.  This does not mean that the legal 
expression of the politics of regime-induced conflicts in global governance is meant to dodge 
politics in the way the indicator project does.  Yet, the legal language of inter-scalar PB does 
give the resolution of regime-induced conflicts a veneer of objectivity, certainty, and reason.  
And, these seemingly ‘scientific’ properties are PB’s charm to those concerned about regime-
induced conflicts.139  On this view, the inter-scale of PB and the indicator project converge 
on their politics-averse character.  As it turns out, the enthusiasm about the inter-scale of PB 
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suggests the attempt to substitute science for politics as the legitimate foundation for the 
management of regime-induced conflicts.140  In sum, although PB is neither rid of politics nor 
meant to be so, politics in the guise of PB is obscured. 
I have noted in Section 3 that PB within the same legal order pivots on the assumed 
objective value, which guarantees its efficacy and legitimacy.  The assumption of an objective 
value further rests on the premise that members of a common place that bring forth the legal 
order can subscribe to a common value on account of shared culture, history, and mores as 
well as interest.141  This community-embedded premise is foundational to the legitimacy of 
balancing.142  When balancing extends beyond a single legal order, that premise falters and 
the legitimacy of balancing is plunged into contestation. 143   Balancing presupposes a 
legitimacy-bestowing politics, not the other way around.  Specifically, even though judicial 
balancing is reminiscent of judicial lawmaking,144 PB secures its legitimacy on the grounds 
that it is conducted by the institution entrusted with that power.145  Yet, as observed above, at 
the core of regime-induced conflicts are competing stakeholder interests in the administration 
of global governance without an authoritative voice.  Against this distinctive political 
backdrop, the very legitimacy of inter-scalar PB becomes an issue when it is deployed to 
manage the politics of global governance, despite its rationalist propensity and scientific 
property.   
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Once the political underpinnings of inter-scalar PB are uncovered, its legitimacy as the 
inter-scale of regime-induced conflicts cannot be presumed but rather becomes contested.  
Parrying contestation, inter-scalar PB only asserts legitimacy in the steering of regime-induced 
conflicts in the name of law’s reason, certainty, and objectivity.  The role of judgment, bias, 
tactical alliance, and other less normative factors underpinning the formation of regime-
specific rules and the coordination of legal regimes in global governance are thus obscured,146 
worsening the legitimacy problem of global governance.  The inter-scale of regime-induced 
conflicts amounts to resolving the politics about legitimacy into the law of PB.  Although the 
inter-scale of PB may help to decide the applicable law in each instance of regime-induced 
conflict, it is not ‘jurisgenerative’.147   On the contrary, the legal ‘resolution’ of regime-
induced conflicts in global governance is ‘jurispathic’ as the applicable law resulting from the 
exercise of PB results from a managerial lawmaking process.148  To be sure, the lawmaking 
process embedded in the management of regime-induced conflicts is political.  Yet, the 
politics in the lawmaking of governance regimes is hardly an inclusive discursive politics but 
rather confined to its direct stakeholders, despite its impact on people other than those centring 
on individual regimes.149  If so, what can we expect of PB in the steering of regime-induced 
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conflicts?  
To answer this question, let us first rewind a bit and recall PB in its conventional form.  
It is noteworthy that although proportionality and balancing have become a popular legal 
language, their overtones of analogy suggest that they have long been common factors in the 
making of everyday decisions in the human society.150  Adopted as a judicial language,151 
PB is widely embraced for empowering the court to take hard look at constitutional issues 
resulting from conflicting claims on solid grounds of legitimacy.  Appealing to the rationalist 
PB, the lawmaking court speaks the language of authority and is shielded from accusations of 
judicial interventionism when setting aside the political branch’s policy. 152   Yet, PB is 
effective only thanks to the authority conferred on the court.  It is the final say the court has 
over the legality or constitutionality of policies that brings forth the sense of certitude about 
the exercise of PB.153  In this light, the emphasis on the legal character of inter-scalar PB 
among its advocates is misplaced.  In the absence of an effectual central international judicial 
body, the hope that PB will play the role of a new conflict-resolving rule in the legal 
administration of global governance seems to be dimmed.154  To reconceive the role of PB in 
regime-induced conflicts, it needs to be freed from the conflict of laws thinking and 
disentangled from the quest for the objective inter-scale.   
As its supporters have observed, PB does not necessarily end up being politics-averse as 
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discussed above.  Rather, it serves as the framework within which politically contested issues 
can be argued about and resolved through practical reasoning.155  In this way, law tames 
politics without colonizing it.  This political and practical reading of PB merits close 
attention.  Yet, it does not go far enough, especially when it is deployed in the decentralized 
global order with no authoritative judicial body sitting on the top.156  Failing to disclose the 
distinctive political setting in full, appealing to practical reasoning conceals rather than tames 
the politics of inter-scalar PB.   
As noted above, inter-scalar PB, as it is, points to a jurispathic lawmaking, which does 
the global rule of law project a disservice.  As Robert Cover powerfully argued, narratives, 
instead of precepts, are what make the common political space jurisgenerative and turns the 
corresponding legal order into a nomos, a normative world enriched with meanings we 
inhabit.157  To engender a jurisgenerative global rule of law, narratives have a role to play in 
the management of regime-induced conflicts in global governance.  Extending beyond their 
roots in literature, narratives have been a major tool of IR scholars in the reconstruction of 
international politics. 158   For example, ‘strategic narratives’ are considered important to 
reshape the international order.159  In this light, to fully uncover the political character of 
regime-induced conflicts, PB can be reconceived as a constructive narrative framework within 
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which the political question of inter-scalar legitimacy can be confronted.  Viewed thus, the 
inter-scale of PB should not be expected to yield legally authoritative results.  Rather, any 
conclusion from it should be treated as provisional, subject to further modification.  In this 
way, inter-scalar PB is not so much a scale as a platform.  Its function is to bring all competing 
factors in regime-induced conflicts together for contestation instead of deciding which 
governance regime has more ‘weight’.  On this view, who is to be included in the platform 
should remain open and be constantly contested.  The conflicting interests of stakeholders, 
other interested parties, and the regime-specific institutions can thus come to the fore in the 
ongoing debate about the relationship between governance regimes in global governance.  
Moreover, the compatibility question that haunts PB can be unveiled and tackled head-on.  
Under this new understanding, the inter-scale of PB provides a language in which values, 
conflicts, and interests of each regime can be argued, narrated, and provisionally resolved as 
part of the politics of reforming and constructing global governance.  In this way, PB is 
instrumental in the ‘jurisgenesis’ of regime-induced conflicts and global governance. 
5. Conclusion 
The question of regime-induced conflicts looms large in the fragmented landscape of 
global governance.  PB, the darling of legal academics and practitioners for the past thirty 
years or so, finds its new calling in the legal resolution of regime-induced conflicts.  In this 
paper, I have tried to shed light on the attempt to apply PB to the coordination of the relations 
between governance regimes from the perspective of competing institutional arrangements of 
global governance.   I first discussed the deployment of PB in the ostensible conflicts 
between the law of state immunity and IIL and then took a closer look at the features of inter-
scalar PB as intimated in those examples.  Simplism, normativism, institutionalism, and 
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legalism are central to the inter-scale of PB.  These four features help to reformulate the 
question of regime-induced conflicts as one of rights conflicts or the balancing of rights and 
public interest under inter-scalar PB.  As a result, the complex fundamental issues concerning 
the relations between governance regimes are either excluded or obscured in the resolution of 
regime-induced conflicts with the political character of the legal administration of global 
governance concealed.  After disclosing the depoliticization tendency in the inter-scale of PB, 
I juxtaposed it with the indicator project in international human rights advocacy, suggesting 
that both are jurispathic and reflect the rationalist propensity in the legal administration of 
global governance.  Drawing inspiration from the constructivist application of narratives in 
IR scholarship, I suggested a departure from the conflict of laws thinking prevalent in legal 
scholarship on global governance.  As a platform rather than an (inter-)scale, PB provides a 
narrative vis-à-vis legal framework within which the fundamental values and principles of 
individual regimes are to be politically contested.   
Regime-induced conflicts and the response as discussed in the paper illustrate the 
character of the rule of law project.  Under this project, law is seen as the antidote to political 
anarchy.  The history of domestic legal development is one of struggling to tame politics with 
the law.160  Domesticating the anarchic international politics has also driven the development 
of modern international law.161  The legal administration of global governance is another 
chapter to the long story of fighting political anarchy with the law.162  Calls for resolving 
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regime-induced conflicts through PB echo this rationalist tradition.   
Yet, as I have pointed out, the rationalist propensity gives short shrift to the complexity 
of global governance and other rule of law projects.  The derogatory terms such as legalistic, 
managerial, jurispathic, to name but a few, give expression to the dissatisfaction with the state 
of the global rule of law project.  To make the global rule of law into a process of jurisgenesis, 
we need to face up to the fundamental question of its legitimacy and the underlying political 
conflicts.163  PB, reconceived as a language in which values, conflicts, and interests of each 
governance regime can be argued and narrated as part of the politics of reconstructing global 
governance, is a jurisgenerative step towards rethinking the meaning of the global rule of law. 
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